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A R T c l E s A N D r E A T u R E 
RESPONSE 
Premerger Review and Bankruptcy: 
The Meaning of Section 363(b )(2) 
by Robert B. Grtenbaum and A./Qn }. !tlee.\·e 
Section 363(h)(2) of the Bimkruptcy Code al!ers the practice under the llart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust lm-
pmvements Act OISR Act) when a party 
acqu1rcs assets of a hankrupl estate Sec-
tion .l63(h)(2) pmvidcs that "nutwith· 
standing subsection (b) nf lthe IISR 
Aclj. the required waiting period" shilll 
last ten days ;;fter nutificatiun of the gov-
ernment "unless the cuurt. ilfler notice 
and hearing, orders otherwise." II 
li.S.C. § 36.\(b)(2)(B). James Spc;m •. 
FTC General Counsel, has ilrgued in thi~ 
magatine !Spring IIJI.J2, at 19lthill this 
provisiun simply 11r1ens the initlill 
l'Ulllpnnent of the II~,{ Act Wiliting pc· 
rind. that is, the urdinary ,l() .. day delily 
that ensue~ upon nntilicatiun of the gov-
ernment. Under this approach. 363(hll2) 
lms no effect un the secund cumpunent 
uf the waiting period. namely. the delily 
that ensues upon issuance uf il sel·mul 
request. 
Mr. Spear~' (lll\itiun •~ cun~istenl with 
that of the Feder;~l Trade Commission.' 
Indeed, in one CiJse in whid1 the iiUthors 
were involved, the Cummissiun went su 
li1r ••~ tu issue a sel·und request without 
nntifyin!! the h;mkruptcy l'oun supervis-
mg the eslatl' in lJUesliun. ·' The Dcpilrt-
mentuf Ju,til·e app••rently takes alliff\~r­
enl pusillun. i.e., that Sel·tiou J6.,(h)l.'!l 
mudilie~ the entire IISR Act w;1iting pc· 
rind, with the re~ult lhilt unly the hank-
rupll"?' mun l'iiO extend the Wiliting pc-
riud. Sem111: hill 540. introduced l'arher 
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this yeilf, wuulrJ clarify the stalutl•'s 
mcilning. 
Accmding to Mr. Spcm·s, the hmgu;~ge 
of Section 363(b)(2) dues nul resolve the 
lllilller. 111aking it m.l'eSSilry tu resort In 
utht·r methods of inlcrprclillion. Sud1 itn 
inquiry. he asserts,cnmpcls a cnndusion 
lhill Section J(,:\(b)(2) leaves the ~uvern­
menl free tu delay an al·4uisitum viii issu-
illll·e nf il second request. We di!lagrel·. 
The urdinary meaning of Sectmn 
.l6.,1hJ(2) requires the cnndusiun thallhl' 
!llallllc supplimls the mitiill Clllll(lllOent 
of the lfSR Al'l waiting periud itS well 
a!l the delily lhal l'nMie~ U(lllll is~Uilnce 
of a semnd relJUest. Til delily iln al·quisi-
linn hy more thiln Ill days. the guvern-
melll must pel ilion the bankruptcy court. 
Section 363(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code alters the 
practice under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act (HSR Act) when a party acquires 
assets cf d oankrupt estate. James Spears, FTC General 
Counsel, has argued that this provision simply shortens 
the initial component of the HSR Act waiting period. 
Mr. Spl~ilrs · pusiliun nml lllill nf the 
('nnuui~sinn nel.·css;Jrily re~l un the il!l· 
sumptinn tlmt the IISR At'll'lllllains two 
distinct Wililing periods: nne l're;Jied hy 
!luhsecllnn (h)( I), and unl' l'renled hy 
subsections (e)( I ) ilnd I 2) .' Thus. the ar-
gument l'lllllinues, Section J63(h)(21 
modilies only the former "wailing pc· 
riml," le;Jvint! lhe "second wailing pt·· 
rillll" inl:ll'l. lJmler lhi~ ••ppru<~ch, il 'ec-
nnd IClJUesl prcvenls the cnnsUilllllillinn 
of llll ill'lJUisiliun hcl':IU!Ic suhsel·tions 
(el: I I anll (2) upemle to prl'Venl illl itl'· 
lJUisilion upon issuilnl."l' of il senmd re-
s 
I A /.I. /'I'll '~ 
A R T (.' L E 
quest.~ This reading is inconsistent with 
the language of the HSR Act and the 
Commission's rules implementing it. 
The text of the Act speaks of only 
one waiting period. Section 7 A prohibits 
ccnain acquisitions unless: ( I) both par-
ties have filed the requisite notification 
and (2) "the waiting period described in 
subsection (b)(l) of this section has 
expired." 15 U.S.C. 18a(a). Subsec-
tion (b)( I) provides that "the waiting 
period required under subsection (a)" 
shall last thiny days from notification ( 15 
days in the case of a tender offer) unless 
the period is extended "under subsection 
(e)(2)or(gl(2)." I~ U.S.C. IKa(b)( I )(8). 
The language of the statute reveals no 
second waiting period. Instead, Subsec-
tion (b)( I) creates a single thiny day pe-
riOIIthat can be exteuded upon the issu-
ance of a second request. 
The Commission's own rules conlinn 
this reading. 16C.F.R. § MOJ.20(c), enti-
tled "Waiting Period Extended" provides 
that. un issuam:e of a second request, 
"the waiting period shitll remain in cf-
icct, even though the waiting period 
would have expired, (sec ~ KO.l HI( b)) if 
no .-;uch rct1uest had been made." 
We assume that Congrcslo undcrstund 
the text to which it was referring as well 
as the interpretive gloss placed on that 
lcxt by the Commission.~ Thus, Con-
grcslo must have usl.'d the phraloe "re-
qutred waiting period" in Section 
)6)(b)(2) to encompass both the thiny-
day lime frame created by subsection 
(b)( ll mul any r.xtension of that peri;ld 
effected pursuant to sub~·el·tions (c)( I), 
(e)(2), or (g)(2). It follc:ws, then, that 
Section J6)(b)(2) both supplants the thir-
ty-day interval created by IISR Act loUb· 
section (b)( I) and divests the govern-
ment of its ustml authurily tu extend I hal 
period its l'llnlernplated by the same ~ub­
sectiun. 
The necessity uf this result becomes 
even mure ctunpclling when nne consid-
erlo the implil'<tlinns of the- Commission's 
aprruach fur the opcr:ttinn of tht~ IISR 
Act ihelf. Subsection (a) foreMalls any 
m:quisitinn before "the waiting period 
tlesl·ribct.l in subsection lbl( II of this sel·· 
linn has e:(pirc-tl." I~ ll.S.C ~ IXa(:t). 
The Commission's appruad1. thill is. 
re-ading a reference to "the waiting pc-
ritld"to apply only tuthe thiny-d:ty inter-
.11• .o\:V/II"HI/.\1" 
s A N D 
val explicitly mentioned in subsection 
(b)( I) itself, and not to any extensions 
of it, requires a conclusion that subsec-
tion (a) only prevents those acquisitions 
that would take place before the initial 
thiny-day interval expires. Because sub-
sections (e)( I) and (e)(2) do not them-
selves prevent acquisitions, but only op-
erate to extend the thiny day interval 
of subsection (b)( I ),7 the Commission's 
approach would render a second request 
powerless to prevent an acquisition. 
F E A T U R E 
The ordinary meaning of Section 363(b )(2) requires the 
conclusion that the statute supplants the initial 
component of the HSR Act waiting period as well as the 
delay ~hat ensues upon issuance of a second request. 
In light of the statute's ordinary mean-
ing, Mr. Spears' other arguments arc un-
convincing. Our reading is not un im-
plicit repeal of subsections (e)(2) and 
Cgl(2): rcpcul is quite explicit. Sectiun 
J6)(hl(2) rders to subsection (b) of the 
IISR Act. Subsection (b)( I), in tum, ex-
pressly incorpomtes subsectiuns (e)(2) 
and (g)(:!). Thus,thc reference in Section 
]6J(b)(2) to subsection (e)(2) and (g){1) 
is no murc ur less explicit than the refer-
ence to these provisions contained in 
subsection (a) uf the JISR Act itself. 
Mr. Spears' assenion that our rending 
cannut he correct because it woult.lthwan 
the purpose of Section 7A is equally un-
tenahle. Genentl purposes cannot over-
ride a statute's ordinary meaning. Stat-
utes arc means, nul cnt.ls, and \•lngrcss 
presumably dmoscs the means cognizant 
of lhe increasing cm:ts 'lf pursuing cer-
tain goals more r.nd more vigorously. 
Thus, "it frustrates rather limn cffel·tu-
lltes legislative intent simplistically tu as-
sume thatll'/wtc'l'c'r funhus the statute's 
primary objective must be the law." Ro-
dri~llc•; 1'. Unitc•tl Sllllc'.\", 4XO U.S. 522, 
525-26 ( 1987). 
Scl·tiun .l6)(b)(2) w;ts ohviuusly 
crafletl with two ·:ompeting objectives in 
mind: streamlining the premerger review 
prucess for bankruptlinns while preserv-
ing the g,wernment's ability to review 
proposed transactions. II is not likely tlutt 
interpreting the Section in light of only 
on.: uf these purposes will achieve Con-
gress\ intent. The best evidence of how 
s 
A R T c L E s 
Congress struck this balance is found in 
the language of the statute itself. 
When a firm enters bankruptcy, pow-
erful considerations militate against ex· 
ten•Jed premerger review. lmplementa· 
lion of Section 363(b)(2)'s ordinary 
meaning as we propose here strikes the 
balance between competing interests in 
two ways. First. it a<.cclerate!l the gov· 
ernment's decision concerning the issu-
ance of a second request. Second, it 
wisely tra'lsfers discretion over the 
length of any investigation from the gov-
ernment to the bankruptcy court. This 
court is more likely to possess the ex peri· 
ence necessary to appreciate fully the 
exigencies of the situation. It also will 
be in an excellent position to evaluate 
the antitrust issue most likely to predomi· 
nate, the application of the failing firm 
defense. Such discretion would not be 
"unbridled" as Mr. Spears claims; in· 
stead, like the discretion exercised by 
the government, it would he constmined 
by the values that call forth the delega· 
tion in the lirst instance. 
In Mr. Spears' view, our rending 
wuuld confer "broad, unchecked author· 
ity" un the bankruptcy courts of the sun 
nut ordinarily exercised by such tribu-
nals. lie nssens that, because the author· 
ity we envision docs not involve matters 
thill arise "em/\• in the context of bank· 
ruptcy pruccedings" (emphasis in origi-
nal), it is nut authority uvcr a "cure" 
proceeding that can be left to the bank-
ruptcy court. We disagree. 
As an initial matter, this &~rgument 
A N D 
proves too much. Our reading would vest 
the bankruptcy court with the power over 
both components of the waiting period 
created by IISR Act subsection (b)( I). 
Mr. Spears' reading would merely confer 
authority over the first component. Nei· 
ther matter is the sort that only arises in 
bankruptcy, except, of course, lly virtue 
of Section 363(b)(2) itself. Thus, under 
Mr. Spears' approach,the Commission's 
reading would itself be incorrect,thereby 
suggesting that Mr. Spears' approach tu 
defining "core" matters is off the mark. 
Instead of asking whether the author· 
i!y contemplated relates to those nmtters 
that could only arise in bankruptcy, we 
wuuld ask whether vesting the authority 
111 issue in a bankruptcy judge would im· 
plicate the son of constitutional conl·ems 
that led Congress to draw the "core"/ 
"non-core" distinction. Northc•r11 PiJit'· 
lim· CmiJirltc·timr Co. l'. Mcmllhmr !•ipc• 
l.illt' Co .• 45K U.S. 50 ( ICJK2), held that 
Congress could not vest non-Article Ill 
courts with the pclWl~r to adjudicate tradi-
tiunal cununun law claims. Our ap-
pmlll'h would not confer on the hank-
ruptl'Y cnun any function that Article Ill 
requires to be handled by life-tenured 
JUdges. Instead, it would transfer author· 
ity from one non-article Ill dedsion-
lllilker. the exel·utive branch, tu another, 
the bankruptcy court. 
Mr. Spears' argument based on the 
withdrawal pruvision of 157(d) fares nu 
better. This argument rests on a cuntro· 
versial reading of 157(d) that would re-
quire withdrawal to the district court uf 
F E A T u R E s 
mr.v issue that involves a federal law reg· 
ulating interstate commerce. Ar. Mr. 
Spears concedes, some courts have in· 
steud held that Section 157(d) means 
what it says, i.e .• mandates withdrawal 
only when "btJtlr title II cmc/ other laws 
of the United States regulating . . . inter· 
~tatecmnmerce" arc involved. 2K U.S. C. 
§ I 57( d) (emphases added). • If these 
courts arc correct, withdmwu~ of federal 
disputes is not mandatory, and Congress 
assumed that bankruptcy courts would 
be passing on issues of federal law.~ 
In addition. not all of the courts that 
take a nontextual approuch Ill Section 
157(d) require withdrawal 11'/r('IIC'I't'r a 
federal statute regulating interstate cum-
merce is involved. lnsteud, many l'UUrt~ 
require withdrawal only where the pro-
ceeding requires the bankrupll'Y l'oun "to 
engage in significant interpretutiun. as 
oppc1sed to simple application, uf federal 
laws upan frmn the bankruptcy 
statutes.""' 
Thus, even under thl' majnrity ap· 
prn&tch In§ J57(dl. it is fur from clearthut 
tlel'isions under uur reading uf Section 
363{b)(2) wmrld be subject to mandatury 
withdrawal. AI any rate. even if the inter-
prct;•tinn of Section J57(d) utTered by 
Mr. Spe;1rs is the l'Orrcct nne. all that 
follows is that decisions whether to ex-
tend the Witiling period must be with-
drawn tu the distrirt court. not that Sec-
tion 363(b)(2) should be "interpreted" to 
provide the govern nent with sole discre· 
tion over the re\'ie\oo' of itcquisiticms uf 
wasting assets. • 
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